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Brief abstract
Preliminary findings of the economic impact of avian influenza on poultry farmers 
in South East Asia is reported. Total economic losses in Indonesia are estimated 
at more than US$387 million; in Vietnam direct economic losses are estimated at 
more than US$200 million. Probit and economic surplus results are pending.
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Introduction
This paper presents preliminary findings of the economic impact of highly 
pathogenic  avian  influenza  (HPAI)  virus  on  small  and  medium  scale  poultry 
farmers in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, based on primary data gathered 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The more 
detailed  report  based on  rigorous  analysis will be  released  as soon  as  those 
findings are approved by FAO.
Avian  influenza  has  been  identified  in  poultry for  more  than  a  century, 
although the emergence in South East Asia in 2003 of a previously rarely seen 
highly pathogenic strain (H5N1) of the HPAI virus was unexpected, resulting in a 
global veterinary epidemic that continues to spread around the world.  By May 
2006,  HPAI-H5N1 had  resulted  in  the  deaths  of  127  humans  (WHO,  2006)
including 42 in Vietnam, 37 in Indonesia, and 6 in Cambodia, and the death or 3
culling of more than 300 million poultry.  Economic losses have been estimated 
in the several billions of dollars; macroeconomic damage in 2003-2004 has been 
estimated by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to be as much as 
3% of GDP (Verbiest and Castillo, 2004; World Bank, 2005).
Of greatest concern to world health experts is the potential for the HPAI-
H5N1 virus to mutate into a rapidly spreading strain through human to human 
contact. At time of writing there are no laboratory confirmed cases of human to 
human transmission of HPI-H5N1; all transmission to humans has been through 
bird (or bird fluids) to human contact. Pigs can also be infected by the HPAI-
H5N1 virus from birds, and a coincident concern is that overcrowded pig housing 
with poor sanitation may lead to conditions suitable for mutation of the virus. In 
conditions where livestock (poultry and pigs in particular) are housed in close 
contact with each other (both same-species and cross-species contact) and with 
humans or where markets allow such contact, mutation of the virus to a form that 
is transmissible between humans is more likely.
The latter scenario, referred to in the popular press as the potential global 
pandemic  of  bird  flu,  has  generated  fear  of  widespread  disease  and  death, 
concern for security of human health, and has prompted governments to develop 
pandemic flu response scenarios. The virus has not yet been identified in North 
America, although according to some veterinary experts this is simply a matter of 
time given the migratory patterns of birds and the concentration of the poultry 
industry in North America.4
Food safety concerns are thus relevant, as are concerns for the cost of 
controlling and eradicating the disease should the HPAI-H5N1 strain reach North 
America. Of more immediate interest to production and policy economists is the 
likely impact of HPAI on the poultry markets and international poultry trade in the 
United  States  and  Canada.  If  HPAI-H5N1  does  reach  North  America,  there 
needs  to  be  a  realistic  plan  in  place  for  supporting  reconstruction  and 
rehabilitation of the industry, including compensation; this paper thus should be 
of interest to policy and production economists. US poultry producers in particular 
are concerned that recent gains in poultry market exports could be lost and not 
recovered, an issue currently being considered by trade economists.
Background to the study
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN implemented a number 
of Technical Co-Operation Projects (TCP) in South East Asia in response to the
HPAI crisis. A regional TCP covering Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Thailand 
and Vietnam was developed and became operational in April 2004 to assist with 
planning  and  enacting  plans  for  coincident  and  post-HPAI  sub-sector 
rehabilitation.  Activities  undertaken  by  the  project  included  gathering  of  what 
basic economic data were available and fundamental impact studies to clarify the 
effect on poultry producers. Of particular concern was identification of the needs 
of producers most affected and most vulnerable to the impact of HPAI. As well, 
descriptions  of  the  major  poultry  production  systems  were  addressed  and 5
recommendations  were  developed  for  short-term  recovery  and  longer-term 
rehabilitation.
More than 50% of the rural poor in South East Asia, rely on livestock as 
their primary source of food and income. In the countries studied annual income 
is very low (table 1) and the percentage of villagers living in poverty is high in 
many  provinces  of  the  countries  studied,  surpassing  60-70%  in  some  cases. 
Poultry are the most accessible form of livestock for the majority of the rural poor, 
many  of  whom  are  landless  and  use  either  a  backyard  scavenging  form  of 
livestock  management,  rental  of  basic  livestock  facilities,  or  share  their  living 
quarters  with  their  livestock. While  large  scale  intensive  poultry  production  is 
present in Indonesia and Vietnam, particularly in peri-urban areas near Jakarta, 
Hanoi, and Ho Chi Minh, the majority of poultry farmers are small and medium 
scale producers.
Table 1. Population and income in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
Human population Countries
Millions People/sq km Income per caput 
per annum (US$)
% living in 
rural areas
Cambodia 13.4 71 280 81.5
Indonesia 238.5 117 710 70.0
Vietnam 82.7 247 430 71.7
Source: After World Development Report, 2004; FAO-Stat, 2005.
Data source and methodology
Data were gathered from more than 1200 small and medium scale poultry 
producers  in  Cambodia,  Indonesia,  and  Vietnam  as  well  as  middlemen  and 
market  sellers,  describing  various  characteristics  relevant  to  farm  production, 6
farmer  profile,  use  of  resources,  epidemiologic  information  related  to  highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and other diseases, economic and financial 
indicators, and family demographics.
The data for Cambodia were gathered from the provinces of Phnom Penh, 
Kandal,  Kampong  Cham,  Takeo  and  Siem  Reap  with  sampling  from  20 
commercial farms and 98 backyard farms. Sixteen of the 20 commercial farms 
reported  HPAI  infection;  the  incidence  on  backyard  farms  was  unknown.  A 
number of middlemen (22), market retailers (22) and service providers (10) were 
also interviewed. 
In  Indonesia,  data  were  gathered  from  five  provinces  in  Java  (Banten, 
West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java) covering 350 farms. The 
farms were classified as 100 integrated commercial farms, 75 commercial farms 
with high bio-security, 165 farms with low bio-security, and a small number of 
backyard farms (10). Interviews were conducted with 30 middlemen, 30 market 
sellers, and 20 government veterinary officers. 
Data in Vietnam were gathered from three provinces (Ha Tay, Thua Thien 
Hue, and Tien Giang) covering 808 households. Of the farms sampled, 67 were 
classified  as large scale commercial, 476 as commercial  with low biosecurity, 
112 as small commercial with low biosecurity, 109 as backyard systems, and 44 
non-poultry farming households.
Attributes of the different systems of poultry production in the countries 
studied have been summarized by Dolberg (2005; table 2). An important feature 
of the classification system referred to in table 2 developed and used by FAO 7
(2004) in the approach to restructuring of the poultry sectors of affected countries 
is the categorization of bio-security. Low bio-security systems (sectors 3 and 4) 
are  a  much  higher  risk in  maintaining  HPAI because  of  the  higher degree  of 
contact  with  other  species  including  humans,  and  the  difficulty  in  containing 
infected premises should disease conditions occur. On the other hand, where 
sector 1 and 2 farms are infected the economic impact per farm is likely to be 
greater.
Summary  statistics  were  generated  to  describe  the  income,  economic 
losses,  costs  of  recovery,  and  estimated  social  impact  on  communities. 
Independent probit analysis using the datasets from each country was performed 
to  assess  the  factors  influencing  decisions  on  whether  to  remain  in  poultry 
farming and decisions regarding compensation of producers. Preliminary results 
are presented in this paper to provide initial information; more rigorous results 
are pending. Details of country level poultry numbers are included in tables 3 to 5 
for reference; further details are in table 6.8
Table 2. Characteristics of four different poultry production systems.
Characteristic Systems
Industrial Commercial Backyard
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4
Biosecurity High Moderate
to high
Low to minimal Minimal
Marketing system Commercial Usually 
commercial
Birds usually 






Market outputs Export and 
urban





High High High Low
Dependence on 
goods roads
High High High Low











Birds kept Indoors Indoors Indoors/Part-
time outdoors
Out most of the 
day
Shed Closed Closed Closed/Open Open
Contact with other 
chicken
None None Yes Yes
Contact with ducks None None Yes Yes
Contact with other 
domestic birds
None None Yes Yes
Contact with wildlife None None Yes Yes











Source –  
medications
Market Market Market Government 
and market

















Breed of poultry Commercial Commercial Commercial Native
Owner food security High Good Fair Fair to poor
Sources: Dolberg, 2005; FAO, 2004.9
Table 3. Number of farms and poultry populations in Cambodia.
Number of farms Population ('000) Birds per farm  System
Chicken Duck Total % Chicken Duck Total % Chicken Duck
Backyard 1,881,000 380,000 1,900,000 99.94 11,955 2,727 14,682 90.07 6.36 7.18
Commercial
Broilers 74 74 0.00 379 379 2.32 5,117
Layers 108 108 0.01 400 400 2.45 3,704
Duck 




58 30 88 0.00 0.00
Cambodia 1,901,221 100.00 16,301 100.00 8.57
Source: FAO, 2005.









Commercial integrated (sector 1) 
Broiler 354 13,520 3.00 222
Layer 128 2,418 6.70 2,771
Total 482 15,938 9.70 609
Commercial (sector 2)
Broiler 45,934 38.30 834
Layer 37,707 19.90 528
Total 83,641 58.20 1,362
Other (sector 3) 32.39
Backyard (sector 4) 175.00
Total 275.29
Sources: CASERED, 2004; Ministry of Agriculture, Indonesia, 2005.




Producers 13 million 5,000 2,000
Average 
flock size <500 1 to 3 groups of 500 to 2,000
birds per year > 2,000
% of national
Production 65% 10-15% 20-25%
Details of 
their systems
Buy day-old-chicks, sell live 
birds. Mostly consumed 
locally.
Buy day old chicks from 




Source: Delquigny et al., 2004.10
Table 6. Classification details of farms included in the study.
Country Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4





57 pullet raising 
units








Estimated to have 
400,000 chickens 
and 841,000 ducks
99.9% of the farms 
(1.9 million) and 
90% of the poultry 
population (11.96 
million chickens 









poultry for the 
national market
32.4 million poultry
175 million birds 
per year; 43.5 
million eggs








65% of production; 
involves up to 70% 
of Cambodians
Source: After Rushton and Viscara, 2005.
Results and observations
A high proportion of small scale poultry farming is conducted in sectors 3 
and 4, suggesting that these sectors which have low bio-security are more likely 
to maintain HPAI epidemics. By far the majority of poultry farms in the countries 
studied  fall  into  these  categories  (table  7).  This  creates  a  dilemma  for  policy 
makers;  human  and  veterinary  health  public  policy  aims  to  promote  rapid 
containment  and  eradication  of  zoonotic  disease  while  development  policy 
advocates sustainable agricultural practices accessible to the poor. It has been 
difficult for policy makers to find common ground between these two main areas 
of policy concern.
Cambodia
HPAI-H5N1 was first officially reported in Cambodia on January 23
rd, 2004 
in Kandal and Kean Suay provinces. Affected farms were primarily commercial. 11
Roughly  23,000  birds  were  culled  or  died;  this  number  is  particularly  low 
compared to the numbers of birds lost in neighboring countries.
Table 7. Provinces, poultry systems, and number of birds affected by HPAI-H5N1
in Cambodia in 2004.
Number of birds affected Month Provinces affected
Killed Destroyed Total
System










3 local chicken farms
1 wildlife centre
September Kandal 360 4,400 4,560 Broiler farm
Total 8,359 13,825 22,984
Source: Rushton, 2005.
While economic losses in 2004 from  HPAI-H5N1 due  to bird deaths in 
Cambodia were low, the impact on market price and on consumer tastes and 
preferences  was  apparently  much  higher.  As  table  8  reports,  mean  prices  of 
poultry  products  dropped  significantly  immediately  following  initial  reports  of 
HPAI-H5N1 in Cambodia, but rebounded shortly thereafter to greater than pre-
HPAI  levels,  complicating  analysis  of  micro-economic  impact. Losses  were 
estimated by Gauthier (2005) following conversations with producers and traders, 
and expressed as months of production needed to recover lost production. From 
table 8, broiler chicken markets were most severely affected (nearly three years 
to recover losses) with egg markets also showing high losses (nearly one year to 
recover losses). Duck markets showed the lowest losses.12
Table  8.  Price,  quantity,  and  market  value  of  poultry  products  before,  during 
(January to February 2004), and after the first HPAI outbreak in Cambodia.
Price per unit (US$) Quantity Total Value per 
month (US$)
Item










Broiler 1.04 0.39 1.30 4,500 250 3,800 4,678 97 4,938 9,161 35.3
Eggs 0.05 0.03 0.05 22,000 1,000 22,000 1,029 29 1,201 2,001 11.7
Ducks 0.91 0.81 1.30 300 10 300 273 8 390 530 4.5
Data refer to pre-, during, and after January-February 2005.  Sources: Rushton, 
2005; Gauthier 2005. (Exchange rate US$ = 3,848 Cambodian Riel).
Prices  of  substitutes  (pork,  beef,  and  fish)  increased  in  early  2004  as 
tastes and preferences changed, steering consumers worried about contracting 
avian influenza away from poultry products beyond the month of March when 
sales  of  poultry  products  began  to  rebound.  Unfortunately  data  were  not 
available for substitute products.
While the direct impact of HPAI-H5N1 from losses of poultry was nearly 
negligible in Cambodia in 2004, without a richer dataset it is difficult to determine
the impact due to changes in consumer tastes and preferences. It would seem 
obvious that producers whose greatest percentage of revenue came from poultry 
experienced  greatest  losses;  these  same  producers  probably  also  owed  the 
largest amounts of borrowed capital, increasing losses beyond inventories and 
lost cycles of production. Social losses include the increased cost of protein and 
the loss of a relatively inexpensive source of food (poultry products), possibly 
resulting  in  increased  levels  of  sub-optimal  protein  and  energy  consumption 
extending beyond the months of January and February 2004.13
Despite efforts by Government veterinary public health officials to control 
the movement of poultry during the HPAI outbreaks, 5 of 21 traders interviewed 
continued  their business during  the ban.  A mortality  rate of 1% of  purchased 
stock is considered to be normal by traders – the rate during the 2004 outbreak 
rose to 3.5%, probably attributable to birds infected with H5N1 reaching market 
points of sale. This should a cause for concern to public health officials charged 
with reducing exposure of humans to the HPAI-H5N1 virus.
All small scale producers that were interviewed responded that they would 
continue  to  raise  poultry,  although  one  third  noted  highly  reduced  personal 
consumption of poultry. Of the broiler farms surveyed, 75% expressed a wish to 
continue raising poultry; some producers shifted to pig production while a few 
farms  had  abandoned  livestock  agriculture.  CP  Company,  a  large  feed 
manufacturer and contract grower of poultry and pigs in South East Asia, noted 
that before the crisis, sales of poultry and pig products represented 70% and 
30% respectively. By  August 2004, poultry sales had dropped to 50%.   2005 
objectives  were  for  70%  sales  from  pig  products  and  30%  from  poultry,  a 
complete turnaround from the 2003 marketing strategy.
Indonesia
Indonesia first officially reported HPAI-H5N1 on January 25
th, 2004, 
although significant losses due to unofficial reports (i.e. not officially diagnosed or 
due to delays in reporting) of HPAI occurred starting in August 2003. Data 
collected by CASERED (2004) indicate most significant losses in sectors 1 to 3, 14
particularly sector 3. From July 2003 to January 24, 2004 15 million layers, 2 
million parent stock, and 86,000 broilers died or were slaughtered attributable to 
HPAI-H5N1. Although weekly supply of day-old-chicks reduced sharply by 17.5% 
for broilers and 25% for layers, market prices for live chicks remained constant. 
The price effects of the sharply reduced supply were probably moderated by 
producers (and consumers) changing tastes and preferences as it became 
understood that HPAI-H5N1 is a serious zoonotic disease.
Following January 24
th, 2004 demand for poultry products fell sharply. 
With the subsequent increase in supply chicken prices plummeted to 1,200 
Rupiah (US$0.13) per kg from a mean of more than 11,000 Rupiah (US$1.20) 
per kg. Demand showed continuing signs of improvement by April 2004, and 
prices had recovered to 10,000 Rupiah per kg by June 2004. However, by 
August and September 2004, further oversupply resulted in another round of 
price reductions. Remarkably the egg market appears to have been unaffected, 
possibly due to smuggling of eggs from Malaysia.
Avian mortality losses were primarily in provinces on the islands of Java 
and Bali. In Central Java and Bali, nearly one quarter of all poultry were 
slaughtered, while official reports of HPAI-H5N1 continued to October of 2004. In 
the case of Central Java where peri-urban concentrations of poultry farms are 
highest, provincial poultry losses represented more than half of all poultry losses 
in Indonesia.
Fifteen of the 30 provinces of Indonesia were affected by HPAI-H5N1 in 
2004; 16.2 million poultry either died or were killed during control and eradication 15
procedures. The value of bird losses at pre-HPAI market prices was more than 
US$30 million. Data reported from CASERED (2004) also indicate that market 
demand for day old chicks and feed fell by 40% for layers and 58% for broilers 
during the outbreak; feed demand fell by 45%. Furthermore, poultry industry 
employment fell by more than one 23% on industrial farms and 40% of family 
laborers were unable to continue economic activities related to poultry farming. 
Nearly 60% of layer farmers and more than 90% of broiler farmers drew on their 
personal savings. Most farmers reported sale of personal assets and reduction in 
the scale of poultry farming.
Fluctuations of live broiler prices surrounding the early 2004 outbreak of 
HPAI are displayed in figure 1. All producers would be subject to these price 
fluctuations regardless of level of use of bio-security or the incidence of HPAI on 
farm and in province. Furthermore, the upstream impact of such price 
fluctuations is that demand for day old chicks, already under downward pressure 
from the presence of an avian disease, will reduce further. In the case of 
Indonesia, in January and February roughly 21 million broilers chicks were sold 
weekly; by March 2004 this figure had dropped to 14 million. Prices fell from 
Rupia 2,200 per chick to Rupia 200 per chick.
Total direct economic losses are estimated at US$171 million, not 
including control and eradication costs. Householders reported reduced spending 
on children’s needs including schooling although this was not quantified.16
Table 9. Poultry populations and mortality losses due to avian influenza in 
Indonesia (2003-2004).
Poultry Population (2003) Losses due to HPAI
Province
Birds (‘000) % of total Birds (‘000) % poultry 
affected % of total losses
Lampung 12,602 4.7 2,372 18.8 14.7
West Java 31,295 11.7 1,962 6.3 12.1
Central Java 34,262 12.8 8,178 23.9 50.5
East Java 38,155 14.3 2,260 5.9 14.0
Bali 4,042 1.5 930 23.0 5.7
Other 
provinces 146,437 54.9 485 0.3 3.0
Indonesia 266,794 100.0 16,188 6.1 100.0
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Figure 1. Broiler prices in and around Jakarta January to May 2004. (Source:
Hartono, Indonesian Poultry Information Centre.)17
Indirect losses calculated by the Indonesian Poultry Information Centre 
have been estimated at US$216 million (Dolberg, 2005), although there is no 
valuation of the losses of village and backyard farmers. This is unfortunate as 
they represent 30 million households raising 200 million native chickens.
Vietnam
Vietnam reported first official findings of HPAI-H5N1 on January 8
th, 2004. 
By the end of the outbreak, 58 of Vietnam’s 64 provinces were positive for HPAI-
H5N1 and nearly 17% of the country’s poultry had been destroyed in eradication 
efforts. However, the impact of HPAI has not been the same throughout all 
regions of the country. From table 10, there clearly was tremendous variation in 
the degree of losses experienced in the poultry industry across the country. 
Highest losses were, as was the case for Indonesia, in heavily populated peri-
urban districts; 87% of all losses occurred around Ho Chi Minh City, the Mekong 
delta, the South East, and the Red River Delta, although these areas account for 
less than 60% of total poultry in the country. The latter is due to the high 
proportion of poverty and poultry ownership in more remote non-peri-urban 
areas. While outbreaks have continued in some areas of Vietnam, the country 
has made a strong effort to report and control HPAI-H5N1, and has welcomed 
international assistance to achieve containment and eradication.
Poultry market impact in the market for poultry and poultry products 
affecting traders and retailers. During the initial stages of the outbreak demand 
for poultry meat fell sharply. There were also heavy restrictions on the movement 18
of live birds. This in part was compensated by a more than doubling of prices 
when markets returned to normality, but it would be suspected that quantities 
traded would be far less than prior to the outbreak.
Prices for poultry meat fell during initial stages of the outbreak in 2004, as 
poultry were slaughtered and movements of live were restricted under 
containment and eradication procedures. However, as was seen in Cambodia, 
prices following the HPAI-H5N1 outbreak rebounded to more than double pre-
outbreak levels, although post-outbreak market volumes were probably greatly 
reduced. In terms of loss of birds, sector 4 was hit harder than others in Vietnam 
with highest losses of household flocks. Again, poultry are not the only source of 
income (albeit a major one) for small scale producers, and medium scale 
producers would have lost greater amounts of total capital investment in 
agriculture.
Table 10. Poultry population and losses due to HPAI-H5N1 in Vietnam (2004).
Poultry population Poultry destroyed Estimated losses
Region
Birds ('000) % total Birds ('000) % 
province
% total
losses US$ (‘000) % total
North Central 36,680 14.0 1,902 5.2 4.4 5,133 4.4
Northern
Mountains 42,190 16.1 923 2.2 2.1 4,626 3.9
Mekong Delta 58,499 22.3 18,842 32.2 43.6 49,747 42.3
Ho Chi Minh and
South East 25,114 9.6 9,551 38.0 22.1 27,503 23.4
South Central 16,192 6.2 1,215 7.5 2.8 2,788 2.4
Red River Delta 65,503 25.0 9,137 13.9 21.2 24,778 21.1
North West 8,040 3.1 476 5.9 1.1 1,331 1.1
Central 
Highlands 9,645 3.7 1,123 11.6 2.6 1,584 1.3
Viet Nam 261,864 100.0 43,170 16.5 100.0 117,490 100.0
Source: J. Hancock, unpublished data, FAO, 2005. Value of bird + (slaughter and 
disposal costs) = US$2.72.19
Prior  to  the  crisis  in  July  of  2003,  survey  results  indicated  that  poultry 
production was the main economic activity for 68% of male headed poultry farms 
and  32%  of  female  headed  farms,  whereas  by  July  of  2004  the  figure  had 
dropped  to  30%  and  12%  respectively.  Many  households  have  switched  to 
alternate activities, principally pig production, which has had impact on suppliers 
and consumers of poultry products. Dolberg (2005), with the assistance of the 
Vietnamese  Government,  has  estimated  total  direct  economic  losses  to  be 
greater  that  US$200  million.  As  for  Indonesia,  householders  reported  non-
detailed reduced spending on children’s needs including schooling. Vietnamese 
farmers also reported moving to pig production, reducing size of poultry farms for 
those remaining in the industry, drawing on savings, selling assets and labour, 
and  –  for  small  scale  land  owner  farmers  with  relatively  low  levels  of  total 
investment in poultry – increasing land used for rice production.
Figure  2  portrays  the point  regarding  losses  to  small  vs.  larger  scale 
farmers for Vietnam. While small scale farmers in Vietnam may rely on poultry for 
cash income and food, raising of poultry forms a relatively small portion of total 
household  economic  activities  (5-10%)  compared  to  more  commercial 
enterprises (20-85%). Loss of poultry, while it may mean a loss of particularly 
inexpensive protein and possibly cash for children’s expenses, is not as likely to 
cause  as  devastating  a  blow  to  the  economic  viability  of  a  household.  The 
exception  may  be  for  those  households  in  poverty  or  on  the  verge  of  sliding 
further  into  poverty;  for  these  households,  and  economic  shock  may  mean 20
prolonging poverty due  to reactionary borrowing at high rates or loss of fixed 
assets including housing or land.
Average % of poultry-related income to the total 
household economy







Figure  2.  Percent  of  income  based  on  poultry  farming  activities  for  Vietnam 
(source: Friscia, 2004).
Compensation and access to credit 
The Government of Cambodia plans to develop a compensation scheme 
for poultry farmers affected by HPAI although budgetary constraints make that 
unrealistic for 2005-2006. While compensation schemes have been implemented 
in Indonesia and Vietnam, payments have been nil to slight and farmer-reported 
results have been mixed at best. Full details of compensation schemes are not 
clear but some figures have been reported. The Indonesian Government reports 21
that compensation in two phases was only paid to small scale farmers who were 
forced to cull stock due to HPAI-H5N1. During the first phase of payments, an 
average  of  US$364  was  paid  to  1068  farmers  in  eight  provinces;  during  the 
second  phase,  an  average  of  US$278  was  paid  to  1756  farmers  in  four 
provinces.  Unfortunately,  details  of  the  farm  holdings  were  not  available. 
Preliminary indications from farmers who received payment are that only 10-20% 
of the market value of birds was covered.
In  Vietnam,  similarly  unimpressive  first  accounts  of  compensation 
schemes were reported by farmers. Little total compensation has been disbursed 
despite Government plans to distribute US$13.2 million at a rate of US$0.30 per 
bird, and almost none has reached small scale producers (representing nearly 
60%  of  all  birds  culled).  Larger  commercial  farms  have  reported  some 
compensation although the amount has been no more than 18% of market value 
of  the  birds  culled. Vietnamese  producers  were  supposed  to  receive  day  old 
chicks  under  a  program  of  subsidization,  although  none  of  the  farms  report 
receiving such support.
In Cambodia, small holder credit is generally arranged through informal 
credit arrangements with relatives or neighbors. NGOs, farmer associations, and 
banks played a role for some larger scale farmers. In Indonesia and Vietnam 
banks  have  offered  a  number  of  financial  coping  strategies  including 
rescheduling of loan payments, softening loan conditions, and increasing base 
loan amounts for new customers. However, data gathered from farmers indicates 
that larger scale farmers were more likely to receive credit; 38% of commercial 22
farmers  received  new  loans  as  opposed  to 12%  of  small  commercial  despite 
similar rates of application. The mean volume of credit required by Vietnamese 
farmers was reported as US$270 (small scale), $187.1 (small commercial), $768 
(large commercial),  and $2,665 (industrial enterprises). Volume of credit need 
was not reported for Indonesian farmers.
Further results pending
Using  the  data  summarized  above,  simulations  were  conducted  to 
estimate the economic surplus to consumers and producers before, during, and 
after the HPAI crisis. While results have not been approved for release, early 
indications have been presented at workshops to general consensus that small 
scale generally poor farmers were not left as badly off economically as one might 
expect,  primarily for  the  reasons already outlined.  Again, the  loss of a  cheap 
source of protein and energy is an important loss to compensate, and for some, 
loss of livelihood without re-training may mean increased conditions of poverty. 
Medium and large scale farmers were worst affected, although generally better 
educated and with access to credit and services not available for small scale 
farmers.
Preliminary  results  of  the  net  welfare  changes  to  producers  and 
consumers  in  all  three  countries studied  indicate  that  both  consumers  and 
producers experienced greater than 25% erosion in surplus as both quantities of 
poultry in markets reduced and prices sky rocketed. Ironically, where poultry was 23
relatively easily available in urban areas, it became difficult to sell due to strong 
changes in consumer preferences associated with food safety concerns. 
Probit  analysis results  are  also  pending  that  begin  to  identify  producer
preferences  for  risk  management  strategies  and  compensation  mechanisms. 
Surprisingly,  cash  compensation  appears  to  rank  lower  as  a  coping  and 
response mechanism than does restructuring assistance, restocking, increased 
veterinary care, and education.
Conclusions
A  reluctant  consensus  is  being  drawn  among  the  veterinary  science 
community associated with control and eradication of HPAI-H5N1 that the virus is 
becoming endemic to the region, suggesting that control efforts will become a 
regular event. In contrast to this view is the strong position that the virus must be 
eradicated before endemicity is clearly established, due to the very serious risks 
of  mutation  of  the  HPAI-H5N1  to  a  form  that  will  transmit  between  humans, 
setting off a global influenza pandemic with high losses of human life. Meanwhile, 
poultry farmers, governments in South East Asia, and international organizations 
are racing to overcome the conditions favourable to viral transmission leading to 
further epidemics. This includes restructuring of the poultry sectors of Indonesia 
and  Vietnam,  and  possibly  Cambodia.  In  other  countries  of  South  East  Asia, 
planning  of  restructuring  programmes  has  already  been  initiated  although 
progress in development and implementation is slow.24
An  important  part  of  a  well  thought  out  approach  to  compensation, 
restructuring, control, and eradication of zoonotic disease should be an economic 
evaluation  of  the  damages  caused  and  the  socio-economic  consequences  of 
decisions  and  policy  implementation.  Unfortunately, as  the  state  of  this  study 
shows, data are difficult to acquire and governments are sensitive to their use 
and release, making the task more difficult. 
Preliminary work conducted thus far allows us to observe several points 
about  the  economic  impact  of  avian  influenza  on  producers  in  Cambodia, 
Indonesia,  and  Vietnam.  In  Cambodia,  the  majority  of  households  keeping 
poultry  have  little  or  no  other  assets,  leaving  them  vulnerable  to  financial 
hardship under conditions of devastating poultry losses. Despite an increase in 
the number of households with poultry following the outbreak of early 2004, and 
despite  post-HPAI  prices  rising  to  greater  than  pre-HPAI  levels,  farmers  are 
generally not prepared for other economic activities during times of low or non-
production  of  poultry.  For  these  small  scale  farmers  HPAI-H5N1  has  caused 
periods  of  significant  economic  hardship.  Nevertheless,  commercial  farmers 
experienced much higher total losses and faced much greater credit repayment 
and asset replacement difficulties representing 75-100% of their gross worth. For 
these farmers, recovering from HPAI-H5N1 was possible only through acquisition 
of new debt or other external capital inputs.
In Indonesia and Vietnam, the picture was somewhat different for small 
scale  farmers.  In  these  countries,  small  scale  poultry  raising  more  clearly 
represents a relatively small proportion of total household earnings, distributing 25
the risk of devastating losses across several sources of economic activities. The 
majority of small scale poultry farmers in these countries rely on a mix of crops, 
off-farm  labour,  and  other  livestock  enterprises  for  income  generation.  While 
HPAI-H5N1 may have resulted in significant short-term losses, the largest losses 
were experienced by medium and large scale farmers with much higher levels of 
total  investment  in  poultry  production.  For  these  farmers,  while  recovery 
mechanisms may be easier to access, the economic impact of recovery will be 
longer lasting than for small scale producers.
Despite  these  observations,  an  important  point  regarding  poverty 
alleviation needs to be made clear. Small scale farmers, though in general have 
lower  levels  of  total  asset  investment  in  poultry,  may  be  far  more  reliant  on 
poultry for a source of protein and energy, particularly for children. This may be 
one of the most important and overlooked points in recovery schemes – there is 
no compensation for those families who have lost this source of cheap nutrition 
and  cannot  afford  substitutes  such  as  pork  or  beef.  Development  of  policy 
options directed at compensation, restructuring, and eradication needs to include 
this dimension in planning and implementation.26
References
CASERED  (Indonesian  Centre  of  Agricultural  Socio-Economic  Research  and 
Development).  2004.  Socio-Economic  Impact  Assessment  of  the  Avian 
Influenza Crisis in Poultry Production Systems in Indonesia, with Particular 
Focus on Independent Smallholders. Final Report for FAO’s TCP/RAS/3010 
“Emergency Regional Support for Post Avian Influenza Rehabilitation”. FAO, 
Rome.
Delquigny,  T.,  M.  Edan,  D.H.  Nguyen,  T.K.  Pham,  and  P.  Gautier.  2004. 
Evolution and impact of avian influenza epidemic and description of the avian 
production  in  Vietnam.  Final  report  for  FAO’s  TCP/RAS/3010  “Emergency 
Regional Support for Post Avian Influenza Rehabilitation”. FAO, Rome.
Dolberg, Frands.  2005. Emergency Regional Support for  Post-Avian Influenza 
Rehabilitation, TCP/RAS/3010(E). Summary of project results and outcomes. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome.
FAO. 2004. FAO Recommendations on the Prevention, Control and Eradication 
of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Asia. FAO Position Paper, September 
2004. Rome.
FAO-Stat. 2005. http://apps.fao.org. Date accessed: November 18, 2005.
Friscia, Fabio. 2004. Socio-economic impact of avian influenza.  Report prepared 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Hanoi, for the 
Department  for  Agricultural,  Forestry,  and  Fisheries  Statistics,  General 
Statistics Office (GSO), Government of Vietnam.27
Government  of  Indonesia.  2005.  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Government  of 
Indonesia. http://database.deptan.go.id/bdspweb. Date accessed: November 
22, 2005.
Rushton, Jonathan and Rommy Viscara. 2005. Emergency Regional Support for 
Post-Avian  Influenza  Rehabilitation,  TCP/RAS/3010.  Impact  of  avian 
influenza outbreaks in the poultry sectors of five South East Asian countries: 
Cambodia,  Indonesia,  Lao  PDR,  Thailand,  Viet  Nam  - outbreak  costs, 
responses and potential long term control. Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations. Rome.
Verbiest, J-P. A. and C.N. Castillo. 2004. Avian flu: an economic assessment for 
selected developing countries in Asia. ERD Policy Brief Series, No. 24. ADB, 
Manila, Philipines.
World Bank.  2004.  World  Development  Report  2004.  Oxford  University Press 
and the World Bank. Washington, D.C.
World Bank. 2005. Personal communication: ASEAN Parliamentary Seminar on 
Avian Influenza, Bangkok, 2005.
World  Health  Organization.  2006.  Avian  influenza  fact  sheet;  February  2006. 
WHO, Geneva.